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Belief in a Just World, Blaming the Victim,
and Hate Crime Statutes*
DHAMMiUA DHARMAPALA, NUNO GAROUPA, and RICHARD McADAMS
University of Connecticut; University offllinois; University of Chicago
The earliest economic theof of discrimination proposed the subsequently neglected idea of a "vidous
cdrcle" of discrimination (Myrdal, 1944). We draw on psychological evidence (that people derve
utiliy from beieding that the world is just) to propose a behavioral economic model in which the
cious circle envisaged by Myrdal can adse. We demonstrate the power of this approach through an
application to the issue of whether and how to justify penaly enhancements for hate crmes against
members of disfavored groups. The crudal assumption is that individuals engage in biased inference
in order to preserve their Belief in a just World, thus attributing the disproportionate victimization
of a group to that group's negative characteristics, rather than to the hate-motivated preferences of
offenders. In a simple two-period setting, we show that disproportionate victimization of the
disfavored group in the first period can lead to additional crime against that group in the second
period The reason is that potential offenders' inferences about the aictimized group's characteristics
become more negative as a consequence of disproportionate victimization, raising the net benefits of
crime against that group (under the assumption that the benefits of crime depend party on the
vctimized group's perceived characteristics). Our main result is that penaly enhancements can
reduce the social harm due to these extra crimes.
1. INTRODUCTION
Consider these incidents:
> Example 1: High school students routinely assault and abuse a small clique of punk
rockers. As a consequence, there is a stronger feeling in the local community that
people hanging around town dressed as punks are likely to harm the community.
With time, more individuals (some not even high school students) engage in
assaulting punks.
> Example 2: Homeless women and men are an easy target for youth gangs. Most
people think that some past bad behavior explains their current homeless situation.
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Given their social marginalization and uneasy relationship with law enforcement
agents, violence against the homeless seems to be tolerated by the general population
in the area and to have spread after the initial attacks by youth gangs.
> Example 3: Hate crimes in a community cause an increase in the number of
assaults against its black members. Non-hater whites observe this fact and infer that
the blacks have done something to deserve these assaults. Thus, whites explain the
"extra" assaults as arising from the fact that blacks in the community conform to
some whites' negative stereotypes of them, as by being lazy, immoral, or prone to
criminality. As a result, the perceived shame or expected guilt from victimizing
blacks falls and they suffer from more assaults, robbery, and car theft.
The first two of these examples are loosely inspired by the actual incidents
described in Blake (2001), while the last is a hypothetical. All three, however,
share a common pattern in which an identifiable group is subject to
victimization for which the group is partly blamed, which then leads to more
negative perceptions of the group. These negative perceptions, in turn, lead
to increased victimization. This "vicious circle" has much in common with
the theory of discrimination proposed by Myrdal (1944). According to his
account, an exogenous increase in discrimination against a disfavored group
leads to worse outcomes for that group. Members of the dominant group
then interpret these bad outcomes as evidence of the disfavored group's
intrinsic negative characteristics, which leads to more discrimination. This in
turn causes even worse outcomes and more negative inferences about the
disfavored group's characteristics.
The victim-blaming in Myrdal's vicious circle is puzzling from the
perspective of standard economic models in which agents engage in rational
Bayesian inference. In particular, it requires that members of the dominant
group naively ignore the effects of discrimination on the disfavored group's
outcomes.
In this paper, we propose a behavioral economic model in which the
vicious circle envisaged by Myrdal and the above examples can arise. We
assume the existence of racial animus (Becker, 1957) and then demonstrate the
significance of victim-blaming through an application to the analysis of hate
crime statutes. The basis for the model lies in a psychological literature,
pioneered by Lerner (1965), showing that most individuals feel a strong need
to believe that they live in a world that is just, in the sense that people
generally get what they deserve and deserve what they get (B6nabou and Tirole,
2006:700). Although these psychological experiments are potentially subject to
multiple interpretations, we argue in Section 2.2 below that the phenomenon
is sufficiently well-studied that an exploration of its consequences for the law
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is warranted. We also argue that the Belief in a Just World can reasonably be
interpreted as a bias, which we term the "just world bias" (JWB; the term
"Belief in a Just World" (BJW) is used below to denote the broader concept).
One interpretation of this belief is that it represents a form of
self-deception that is sustained in equilibrium because there is a demand for
and supply of motivated beliefs (B6nabou and Tirole, 2006). The demand arises
because believing that the world is more "just" than it actually is works as a
form of self-commitment that overcomes weakness of will by motivating
more effort.' If people believe the world is more just than it actually is, then
they will generally infer that bad outcomes are more "deserved" by those
who suffer them than is actually the case, meaning that bad outcomes are
more the result of the victims' negative characteristics or misbehavior than is
actually the case. If so, then when discrimination causes its victims to suffer
bad outcomes, observers will over-attribute the outcome to the victim's
negative characteristics and under-attribute the contribution of
discrimination. This skewed belief preserves the belief in a just world. Stated
differently, given an exaggerated prior about the degree to which outcomes
are deserved, it is rational to infer that bad outcomes are more deserved than
they actually are. Believing they are deserved can then make rational
additional forms of discrimination. Although there are many potential
applications, in our example, hate crimes cause more negative beliefs about
the characteristics of the hate crime victims, which in turn leads to more
(non-hate) crime.
Hate-motivated crimes have attracted the scholarly attention of a large legal
and philosophical literature (e.g. Lawrence, 1999; Hurd and Moore, 2004) and a
small but growing economic literature (Dharmapala and Garoupa, 2004;
Dharmapala and McAdams, 2005; Gan, Williams and Wiseman, 2004). The central
issue in this analysis is whether and how to justify penalty enhancements for
hate crimes. In this paper, we derive a Myrdalian vicious circle from the
Belief in a Just World, an approach that can provide a justification for hate
crime penalty enhancements that does not rely on fairness considerations (as
in Harel and Parchomovsky, 1999), and that applies more broadly than do the
efficiency arguments in Dharmapala and Garoupa (2004).2 We reach this
result by extending the model of Dharmapala and Garoupa to include not
only the Belief in a Just World (BJW), but also a new variable representing
the moralistic beliefs that a potential offender holds about the characteristics
of a potential victim. Specifically, these beliefs concern the perceived intrinsic
value or "moral worth" of the individual one may victimize. We assume the
beliefs affect the potential offender's costs (net benefits) of crime by
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1276
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affecting the expected guilt or shame of the criminal act. In particular,
members of the dominant group may hold negative beliefs about the
characteristics of members of the disfavored group, e.g., their dishonesty,
immorality, selfishness, laziness, or lack of patriotism. The more negative
these characteristics are believed to be, the less are the expected costs from
committing a crime against a member of the disfavored group.
We use this framework to show that, absent the BJW, penalty
enhancements do not influence Bayesian inferences about group
characteristics (because the p nalty enhancements themselves will convey as
much information about such characteristics as will disproportionate
victimization). Then, we analyze how penalty enhancements may influence
inferences about victims' characteristics in a setting where potential offenders
tend to overestimate the degree to which people deserve the outcomes they
receive. The general intuition underlying the model is as follows: hate crimes
cause negative outcomes for its victims; those with a strong prior Belief in a
Just World infer that these outcomes are caused by the victims' negative
characteristics; these inferences lower the expected cost of crime against such
victims and therefore cause more crime.
More specifically, our model demonstrates that, in a setting with no penalty
enhancements, both haters and non-haters in the dominant group commit
crimes against the disfavored group, which suffers from disproportionate
victimization. We assume that a new cohort of non-haters within the
dominant group observe the rate of victimization and make inferences about
the number of crimes attributable to haters' preferences and the number
attributable to non-haters' beliefs about the victimized group's negative
characteristics. Because not all crimes are solved, those inferences are made
in the face of uncertainty. Attributing an unsolved crime to a hater poses a
greater conflict with a Belief in a Just World than attributing an unsolved
crime to the victim's negative characteristics.3 Observers with an excessively
strong Belief in a Just World will therefore attribute fewer of the unsolved
crimes to haters and more to the victim's negative characteristics than would
someone with a more accurate view of the world's justness. Failing to
account for the full extent of discriminatory preferences in the face of
uncertainty, the BJW causes such observers to revise their beliefs about the
victim's characteristics in a negative direction. These revised beliefs in turn
raise the net benefits from crimes against that group, which causes additional
crimes against that group.' Our central result is that penalty enhancements
for hate crimes can reduce the social harms associated with these additional
crimes.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a background on hate
crimes and the just world bias. Then, the basic model is presented in Section
3, while Section 4 discusses the implications of our model, and concludes.
2. BACKGROUND ON HATE CRIMES AND THE
JUST WORLD BELIEF
2.1. HATE CRIMES
In recent years, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (2005) has tabulated
reports of "hate crimes" involving 9,000-12,000 victims per year. Most of
these crimes are based on race. Some (such as the murderous rampages
described in Dharmapala and McAdams, 2005) are severe, but most are less
serious, involving crimes such as vandalism, intimidation, or simple assault
(FBI, 2005). Because many crimes go unreported, victim surveys report
higher numbers. The National Crime Victimization Survey shows an annual
average of 210,000 hate crime victims in the United States from 2000 to 2003
(Harlow, 2005).
Most U.S. jurisdictions define a crime as a hate crime if it is committed
because of the perpetrator's animus or hatred toward a racial or other
specified group, or, more broadly, if the victim is selected because of
membership in a specified group.5 For example, federal sentencing guidelines
provide for a "penalty enhancement" if the defendant "intentionally selected
any victim or any property as the object of the offense of conviction because
of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person" (28 U.S.C. 994 (1994)).
Most states have similar laws for offenses, though the list of possible groups
varies widely (Grattet et al., 1998). As a result, a hate crime may be punished
more harshly than the same crime absent the hatred or discriminatory motive
the perpetrator had for committing the offense.6
2.2. BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD
The excessive Belief in a Just World has much in common with other
psychological phenomena economists have explored. For example, if one is
to be overconfident about one's outcomes, e.g., Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler
(1998), then one must not only have excessive optimism about one's own
abilities, but also excessive optimism about the way the world works, that it
tends to reward deserving people like oneself Similarly, the literature on the
fundamental attribution error (surveyed in Dharmapala and McAdams, 2005)
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1276
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demonstrates that people tend to over-attribute outcomes to individuals
(their traits and behaviors) and to under-attribute outcomes to the constraints
the individual faced. If so, then we would expect individuals to attribute
some excessive blame to those who suffer bad outcomes. As explained
above, one can follow Benabou and Tirole (2006) in interpreting these
skewed inferences as a product of rational but skewed intergenerational
transmission of information (where parents with lower discount rates than
their children indoctrinate their children in BJW to motivate them to work
harder and be more obedient). But one might also follow the literature on
cognitive dissonance (e.g., Akerlof and Dickens, 1982) and "motivated belief'
(e.g., B6nabou and Tirole, 2002) and interpret the BJW as a means of
self-deception to relieve anxiety about the arbitrariness of the world or to
self-commit in the face of one's imperfect willpower.
The evidence that people tend to believe excessively in a just world come
mostly though not entirely from laboratory experiments.7 In the pioneering
study of Lerner and Simmons (1966), subjects viewed on a television what
appeared to be a contemporaneous experiment on learning, in which a
subject (actually a confederate of the experimenters) received painful electric
shocks for giving incorrect answers. After ten minutes, the experimenters
asked subjects to evaluate this "victim." Before making their evaluation,
however, the experimenters told the subjects either (1) that they would
thereafter watch the same person in another ten minute session of the same
experiment (the midpoint condition) or (2) that they would thereafter
anonymously vote on whether the person would continue with the negative
reinforcement experiment with electric shocks or be moved to a positive
reinforcement experiment with monetary rewards (the reward condition). In
the latter reward condition, the result of the vote (which was always to move
the victim into the reward scenario) was announced before the subjects
evaluated her. The main result was that subjects evaluated the victim
significantly more negatively in the midpoint condition than the reward
condition. Lerner and Simmons inferred that the midpoint condition was
more threatening to the subjects' sense of justice than the reward condition,
because only in the latter could the subjects restore justice by ending the
suffering and rewarding the victim for past suffering. Without that power to
correct injustice, the subjects adjusted their views of the victim negatively to
make her seem more deserving of her bad outcome.8
Psychologists have found similar effects in experiments using a variety of
more typical victims, from those suffering poverty in developing nations
(Reichle and Schmitt, 2002), to cancer victims (Maes, 1994), and, most relevant
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for our purposes, crime victims (Wyer et al., 1985; see also Lincoln and Levinger,
1972). For example, in Wyer et al. the experimenters had subjects read
vignettes about a rape after previously "priming" them with exposure to
photographs of various sorts. When the priming photographs depicted
aggressive acts - other apparent crimes - that challenge the idea of a just
world, the experimenters found that the subjects were significantly more
likely to evaluate the putative rape victim negatively and to hold her
responsible for the rape (Wyer et al., 1985:330-32, 337). Thus, the recent
perception of a threat to the Belief in a Just World (BJW) causes greater
adjustments of beliefs to preserve the BJW.
Although the literature is extensive, it is unfortunate that none of these
experiments uses the distinctive methods of experimental economics, which
test behavior in settings where subjects are provided with monetary
incentives to act rationally. One might, for example, expose subjects to an
individual's victimization and then place them in a situation in which they
have the opportunity to trade with the victim. We hope that such economic
experiments will be carried out in the future (and that this paper highlights
some of the important policy applications that would be at issue in such an
exercise).
Nonetheless, the voluminous psychological literature is at least suggestive
of the fact that people overestimate the justness of the world. There are other
forms of evidence that support the point. For example, Hafer (2000a) avoided
relying on self-reported beliefs by employing a "modified Stroop task"9 to
measure the (possibly unconscious) effects of exposure to perceived injustice
(a criminal who escapes punishment) on individuals' ability to perform
certain timed tasks. She found that perceived injustice caused a unique
decline in performance and that those subjects whose timed performance
suffered more were more likely to derogate the victim. In a follow-up study,
this tendency to derogate victims was more pronounced among those whose
survey results indicated a stronger BJW (Hafer, 2002). One famous study
(Rubin and Peplau, 1973) stepped outside the laboratory and found that, in a
gathering of draft-eligible men for a draft lottery in 1971, individuals with
high BJW scores were more likely than others to evaluate lottery winners
ahead of lottery losers, despite knowing that the lottery selected people at
random. Similarly, Benabou and Tirole (2006:704) explain that sociologists
and political scientists have conducted hundreds of detailed interviews of
working-and middle-class individuals on economic concerns and found that,
"much like a religion," people "obstinately hold on to a belief that effort,
hard work, good deeds will ultimately pay off," even when evidence in their
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1276
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own life provides strong evidence to the contrary.
As real world evidence of a strong desire to believe in a just world, one
might consider the success of Hollywood movies in which good characters
are rewarded and bad characters punished. Indeed, psychologists have found
that adults are less likely even to label a narrative a "story" if it contradicts
the just world account (Brewer, 1996). As real world evidence of blaming
victims, surveys of Americans during World War II suggest that they became
more likely over this time to view Jews as wielding too much power in the
U.S. "Far from evoking sympathy, the Nazi persecutions apparently sparked
a rise in anti-Semitism in this country" (Selznick and Steinberg, 1969:63).
Supporting Benabou and Tirole's intergenerational interpretation of their
model, the BJW is particularly strong in children. As noted by Piaget
(1965:260): "A great many children think that a fall or a cut constitute
punishment because their parents have said to them, It serves you right, or
That will be punishment for you, or God made it happen!" This fact should
come as no surprise given how frequently children's stories and myths (e.g.,
Cinderella, Pinocchio, and Santa Claus) "emphasize the rewards that follow
from virtue and the punishments that follow from misbehavior" (Rubin and
Peplau, 1975:72). Indeed, some evidence links children's ability to delay
gratification with their expectation of fairness or justice; see Long and Lerner
(1974) and Mischel (1974). Adults outgrow the crudest form of the heuristic
(Lerner, 1998:267), but the rule of thumb continues to influence the process of
inference. Indeed, the bias may remain functional in adults by increasing the
perceived value of long-term planning (Hafer, 2000b), and so may have
advantages that offset (or render imperceptible) its disadvantages. Hafer
(2000b:1069) surveyed subjects to determine their general Belief in a Just
World and their long-term investment orientation. Across various measures,
she found a significant correlation: "the more participants had a chronic
long-term focus, the stronger their BJW."'o
Other evidence supports the motivated bias interpretation of the Benabou
and Tirole model. Lerner (1998) argues that individuals derive utility from
believing in a just world, or suffer increasing anxiety and stress from
believing the world is increasingly unjust. People are therefore willing to trade
off the utility of BJW against the informational benefits from unbiased
inferences about the world. There is evidence supporting the benefit of some
trade-off, that a BJW correlates with stronger marital relationships (Lipkus and
Bissonnette, 1996) and in coping with bereavement (e.g. Bonanno et al., 2002).
In any event, in one important respect, our model goes beyond the BJW as
it is usually discussed in psychology. We focus on inferences about groups,
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although the BJW is typically discussed in terms of inferences about
individuals. However, we believe that our extension is reasonable. In
explaining how people maintain the BJW, Lerner (1998) says that "the person
who derogates a victim will generate a culturally plausible basis for that
condemnation." The perceived negative characteristics of a disfavored group
to which the victim belongs naturally provides such a basis. Indeed, there is
evidence suggesting that people are less likely to make negative inferences
about individuals who are similar to them in some salient respect (e.g. Lerner
and Agar, 1972). If differences between the individual and victim are sufficient
to heighten the individual's willingness to blame the victim, then we believe it
is a reasonable extension to posit that the individual will use such differences
to "explain" his or her derogation of the victim." The above example (rising
anti-Semitism in the United States during World War II) provides support
for our reasoning.
The relevance of the just world belief and related psychological
phenomena for the study of hate crimes has been recognized previously by
Wang (1997, 1999). Her argument, however, is primarily that victims of hate
crimes suffer greater psychological harms than victims of parallel non-hate
crimes, because the former victims' Belief in a Just World is more seriously
impaired. She also argues (1997:129), as we do, that hate crimes will "promote
[..] prejudice against the [victim's] group" even among those who do not hate
the group. However, we specify a precise mechanism through which this
effect operates, and link the increased prejudice to increased future crime
against the victimized group. In examining the effects of disproportionate
victimization on the beliefs and behavior of potential offenders, our
approach here is closely related to the approach of Dharmapala and
McAdams (2005), which identifies the costs of hate speech by focusing on the
behavior of potential offenders, rather than on the psychic harms suffered by
victims.
2.3. PUBLIC ATTITUDES ABOUT HATE CRIMES
In our model, hate crimes increase the total crimes committed against certain
groups and the greater number of crimes cause non-haters to make more
negative inferences about the crime victims. Our claim is that non-haters fail
to attribute the correct number of these "extra" crimes to the hate
preferences of certain perpetrators and instead over-attribute extra crimes to
the negative attributes of the victims. Our claim rests on an empirical
assertion: that non-haters view hate crimes as more unjust than the same
crimes committed without hate motivation. If this were not the case, then the
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1276
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BJW would have no effect on the inferences made about crime rates. If
otherwise equivalent hate and non-hate crimes were regarded as equally
unjust, then there would be no reason to skew inferences in order to preserve
one's belief in a just world.
There is, however, psychological evidence that most people view crime
victimization caused by hate motivation as more unjust than victimization
caused by negative characteristics of the victims. Rayburn, Mendoza and
Davison (2003:1063) find that subjects exposed to a hate crime scenario view
the perpetrator as being more culpable than the perpetrator in an otherwise
identical non-hate crime. Similarly, even though subjects blame all crime
victims to some degree (2003:1069), they rate the victim of a hate crime as less
culpable than the victim of a non-hate crime (2003:1062-63). 12 Moreover, the
study supports the importance of the inferences made in the face of crime: if
observers know for certain that a crime is the product of discriminatory
preferences, as the scenarios in the experiment expressly made clear, they
blame the victim less. But because individuals do not know for certain the
cause of most crimes (particularly if the law does not force the revelation of
hate motives), the bias has scope to operate, allowing them to attribute the
crime to the victim's negative characteristics and to blame the victim.
Note that this point also explains why hate crime penalty enhancements are
often politically feasible. The public will tend to support hate crime
enhancements because citizens view the hate motivation as making the
perpetrator more culpable and therefore more deserving of punishment.
Given the JWB, the public will of course underestimate how commonly the




Our model is based on the standard economic theory of law enforcement (as
reviewed in Garoupa, 1997, and Polinsky and Shavell, 2000). We extend this setup
to a two-period framework, where the set of potential offenders in period
one is replaced by a new "generation" or cohort of potential offenders who
enter the model in period two. Each of these (risk-neutral) potential
offenders has the opportunity to commit up to one crime against each of two
groups of equal size" - the A's and the 's. For simplicity, we assume that all
potential offenders in both periods are A's, the same approach as in
Dharmapala and Garoupa (2004). '5 The illegal gains from committing the
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crime are represented by the variable b (as is conventional in the economic
theory of enforcement, each individual's b is unobservable, although the
distribution is known). The distribution of offenders (Xs) over b is given by
the cumulative distribution function (cdf) F(b) (note that F(b) is the fraction
of f's who receive benefits less than b from committing the crime).
Let the probability of detection of a crime against a member of group j be
denoted by pj, where j = X, Y. Assume also that this probability does not
change over time. The sanction imposed in period i for a crime against a
member of group j is denoted si. The complete set of sanctions is denoted by
{s~s(,sxLs}.
3.2. RATIONAL LEARNING
In period 1, suppose that px and py are both known to all potential
offenders. Then, (risk-neutral) potential offenders commit the crime against
A's if b > Pxsx. Bearing in mind that the groups are of equal size, the rate of
victimization ofA's is:
rx = 1 - F(pxsx) (1)
Potential offenders commit the crime against Is if b > ps. The fraction of
A's who commit the crime against 's is thus 1 - F(pysj) and the rate of
victimization of Ps is:
rn = 1 -F(pysy) (2)
Suppose that there is no penalty enhancement, and sanctions are uniform
(i.e. sj = sf), but that 's are more "vulnerable," in the sense that py < px
(for example, the police are less likely to investigate crimes against 's, or 's
are less likely to report crimes to the authorities). Then, it follows
straightforwardly that disparate victimization occurs (i.e. ry1 > rxi).
In period 2, suppose that a new cohort of potential offenders knows Px
but not py. Potential offenders commit the crime against A's if b > pxsx so
that the rate of victimization of Xs is:
r, = 1 - F(pxsx) (3)
Let p[ be the probability of detection inferred by the new cohort of potential
offenders (who can observe the sanctions and rates of victimization that
occurred in period 1). The crime level against Is depends on the inferred pL;
from Equation (2), this inference problem can be implicitly characterized by:
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1276
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r = 1 - F(2's Y) (4)
This straightforwardly implies that 'p = pR. Thus, potential offenders
commit the crime against Is if b > pysy, and the rate of victimization is:
r= -F(pYS) (5)
In this setup, rational learning implies that a higher rate of victimization of
Ps in period 1 will lead cetes paribus to a lower inferred p and hence to a
higher period-2 rate of victimization of Ps. That is, crime in period 1
generates additional crime in period 2. However, penalty enhancement in
period 1 (i.e setting s' < s) cannot address this problem, as long as
period-1 sanctions are observable to the new period-2 cohort.'6 For instance,
suppose s were increased, holding everything else fixed. Then, ry, would
fall, but the inference problem (Eq. 4 above) would lead to the same
inference py = py. In essence, period-2 offenders realize that the reason the
victimization rate for Is is low is because of the penalty enhancement, and
they incorporate this into their inference. It follows that penalty
enhancements for hate crimes cannot be explained by a dynamic rational
learning setup of this kind (although penalty enhancements for vulnerable
groups may still be optimal for purely static reasons - i.e. to reduce the harms
from crimes in period 1).
3.3. INTRODUCING HATE MOTIVATION
Now, assume that members of group X can be partitioned into two
(exhaustive and mutually exclusive) subgroups: those with hate motivation
(in a sense defined more precisely below), denoted by XH, and those without
hate motivation, denoted by X.` In each period, the former constitutes a
fraction a e (0, 1) of all A's, and the latter a fraction (1 - a) (these
proportions are assumed to be common knowledge). The illegal gains from
committing the crime, represented by the variable b, differ across the two
subsets of X. The distribution of non-hate-motivated offenders (X"'s) over b
is given by the cumulative distribution function (cdf) F(b), independently of
whether the victim of the crime is an X or a Y (note that F,(b) is the fraction
of X"s who receive benefits less than b from committing the crime). The
distribution of hate-motivated offenders (XH>s) over the benefits from crimes
against other A's is also given by F,(b). However, the distribution of XH>s
over the benefits from crimes against Is is given by the cdf FH(b). The
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notion of hate motivation is captured by assuming that XH>s derive greater
benefits, ceteris paribus, from crimes against Y's. Specifically, following
Dharmapala and Garoupa (2004:190), we assume that for a given b in the
relevant range (in particular, high enough values of b such that the crime may
be committed):
Assumption la: F(b) > FH(b),
i.e., the fraction of XHs who receive benefits less than b from crimes against
A's is greater than the corresponding fraction for crimes against 's. We also
make the following assumptions about the probability density functions
(pdfs):
Assumption 1b: For low values of b,fN(b) > fH(b); for high values of
b,,(b) < fH(b).
To ensure that the cdfs FH(b) and F,(b) are strictly monotonically
increasing, it is also assumed that:
Assumption 2: For all b in the relevant range, (b) > 0 forj = N,H.
Assumption la implies that (in the absence of penalty enhancements) 's
will suffer disproportionate victimization as a result of the discriminatory
preferences of XH>s. This paper introduces another distinct source of
disparate victimization - negative beliefs held by X"s about the
characteristics of 's. These may induce X"'s to disproportionately target 's,
even in the absence of any intrinsic hate motivation. We extend the standard
framework by assuming that the net benefit from a crime committed by a
member of XN depends not only on b, but also on group Ps perceived
"characteristics" (denoted by c > 0).1 These characteristics are assumed to
bear on the (perceived) moral inappropriateness of the individual being
criminally victimized, and correspond to the amount of guilt and shame the
perpetrator expects to feel. The higher is c, the worse the group's
characteristics are perceived to be, so the net benefit from the crime to a
potential offender can be characterized as (b + c) (i.e. a larger c for a
particular group implies a greater net benefit of attacking a member of that
group).'9
For the sake of simplicity, this variable c is assumed to only influence the
behavior of X's, and not that of XHs. The latter's hatred of Ps is presumed
to be independent of these perceived characteristics (or alternatively, the
perception of Ps characteristics among XH>s can be viewed as being
implicitly incorporated into the specification of the FH(b) function, and to be
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fixed across periods).
Without loss of generality, we normalize c in period 1 to zero, so that X's
in period 1 make their decisions about whether to commit the crime on the
basis that c = 0. It is assumed that this first-period value of the
characteristics is not observed by the new cohort of XNs who enter the
model in period 2. In order to make their crime decisions, these individuals
must infer the value of c (more generally, they must update some prior about
c). Our focus is on inferences about the victimized group's intrinsic
characteristics. In practice, it is possible that the inference from disparate
victimization may instead be that members of the targeted group take greater
risks (such as carrying large amounts of cash). This amounts, in effect, to an
inference that the probability of detection (and hence the expected sanction)
is lower when attacking such groups. In our analysis, we assume that the
probability of detection and the expected sanction are common knowledge,
so no updating of beliefs about these variables takes place. Even if the
inference from disparate victimization is that members of the disfavored
group take greater risks, this will lead to a higher level of crime, and so
operate in the same direction as the effect we identify. We denote this
inferred value by 6.20
Define p = px = p, < 1 to be the probability of detection, which is
assumed to be time invariant and independent of the victim's group. The
sanction for a crime against a member of group j in period t is denoted by s{
where j = X, Y and t = 1,2. In addition, it is assumed that hate motivation is
perfectly observable xpost by courts, so the sanction for a crime against a Y
can differ depending on whether or not the perpetrator was motivated by
hate. Given the assumptions made above, all X s who have sufficiently large
b that they commit the crime in equilibrium derive greater benefits from
targeting 's. In this sense, all crimes byXs against 's that are detected are
revealed to be hate crimes (and subject to penalty enhancements, if they
exist). Specifically, if an XH commits a crime against a Y in period 1 and it is
detected, then the sanction is s'. The complete set of sanctions is denoted
by {s{,si,sN,s,sY,sN}. Note that the penalty enhancement for a hate
crime in period 1 (the policy variable on which the analysis focuses) is
(srH - sX).21
The harm to an individual victim of a crime is denoted by h > 0 (and is
independent of the victim's group and the perpetrator's motivation). This
assumption, consistent with Dharmapala and Garoupa (2004), entails that the
private harm to an individual victim from a hate crime is identical to that
from an equivalent non-hate crime, so that we can endogenously derive
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disparities in the social harms that result from a pattern of discriminatory
selection of victims.
3.4. OUTCOMES WITH BAYESIAN INFERENCE
In this subsection, we briefly characterize the outcomes when individuals
engage in Bayesian inference. In period 1, (risk-neutral) potential offenders
commit the crime against A's if b > psf. Bearing in mind that the groups are
of equal size, the rate of victimization ofA's is:
r, = 1 - F,(psx) (6)
XHs commit the crime against Is if b > ps(', and X"s commit the crime
against Is if b > ps'. The fraction of A's who commit the crime against Is
is thus a(1 -F,(ps'H)) + (1 - a)(1 _ FN(pS1")) and the rate of
victimization of Ps is:
r, = 1 - aF,,(ps) - (1 - a)F,(psN) (7)
Suppose that there is no penalty enhancement, and sanctions are uniform
(i.e. sj = sjH = sl"). Then, by Assumption la, it follows that disparate
victimization occurs (i.e. ry > ri). Disparate victimization, under these
assumptions, involves a higher rate of victimization being suffered by Is
than by A's. However, a more general (and more analytically relevant)
interpretation of the disparity is that Is suffer a higher rate of victimization
than they would in the absence of hate motivation among those who commit
offenses against them. In this setup, the two interpretations are equivalent
(because of the assumption that, but for hate motivation, A's and Is would
be victimized at the same rates, given the same penalties), but the latter
generalizes more readily to cases where multiple groups may experience
hate-motivated victimization.22
In period 2, potential offenders commit the crime against A's if b > ps{,
while X"s commit the crime against Is if b > psH. The crime level of X"s
depends on their inferred 6; from Equation (2), this inference problem can
be implicitly characterized by:
1 - rn = aF,(ps') + (1 - a)F(ps -6) (8)
This straightforwardly implies that 6 = 0. Thus, X"s commit the crime
against Ps if b > ps. The rates of victimization in period 2 are
r, = 1 - F,(pst) and rY2 = aFH(pSH) ( -a)( - FN(ps)).
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Note that Equation (8) implies that the new cohort of X"'s in period 2
infers C only on the basis of the observed behavior of the previous cohort of
X's, not on that of XH>s. This assumption captures the intuition that, in
learning about the characteristics of the outgroup, non-hate-motivated
members of the dominant group will not be influenced by the behavior of
those who are known to hate the outgroup. Since XH>s are known to hate Is,
their attacks are correctly interpreted as stemming from discriminatory
preferences, and so do not convey any new information about the
characteristics of Ps.
3.5. INTRODUCING BIASED INFERENCE
In the previous subsection, it was assumed that the new cohort of X"'s in
period 2 observes the first-period outcomes (in particular, the rates of
victimization) and policies (in particular, the expected sanctions), and knows
the preferences (i.e. the distributions F,(b) and FH(b)). That is, these
individuals are aware that XH>s in period 1 have discriminatory preferences,
and correctly attribute the higher victimization rate of Ps to this hate
motivation. However, this extra victimization of Ps through no fault of their
own may come into conflict with the desire ofX"'s to believe in a just world.
As noted above, Rayburn, Mendoza and Davison (2003) offer empirical
support for this claim, finding that subjects view a hate crime perpetrator as
being more culpable than the perpetrator in an otherwise identical non-hate
crime. Similarly, even though subjects blame all crime victims to some degree
(2003:1069), they rate the victim of a hate crime as less culpable than the
victim of a non-hate crime (2003:1062-63). Because individuals do not know
for certain the cause of most crimes (particularly if the law does not force the
revelation of hate motives), the bias has scope to operate, allowing them to
attribute the crime to the victim's negative characteristics and to blame the
victim. By underestimating the role of discriminatory preferences in the face
of uncertainty, observers preserve their belief in the basic justness of the
world.
In this subsection, we introduce the assumption that X"'s engage in biased
inference, thereby generating the just world bias (JWB) discussed above. In
the first period, the outcomes are identical to those characterized in Section
3.4 above. In the second period, however, the JWB will affect the inferences,
and hence behavior, of the new cohort ofXX"s. Specifically, we formulate the
JWB as follows: X"s underestimate the extent of hate motivation on the part
ofXH>s in period 1. An extreme way to capture this idea is to assume that the
hate motivation is completely ignored, so that F is used instead of FH in
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inferring 6.23 Intuitively, all crime against Is in period 1 is attributed to
non-haters. Then, the inference problem is:
1 - rn = aF,(ps) + (1 - a)F,(psN - 6) (9)
i. e.
aF1 (ps') + (1-a)F,(ps) = aF,(psf') + (1-a)F,(ps-6) (10)
The solution to this inference problem, and the main results that follow, are
presented in the following subsection.
3.6. RESULTS
Given Equation (10) above, it follows that:
Remark 1: The assumptions above imply biased inference (i.e. the just
world bias); in particular, 6 > 0.
Proof Rearranging Equation (10):
FN(psN -6) -FN(psN) = a (F1 (ps 1u) - FN(ps,)) (11)
Suppose that 6 < 0. Then, F,(ps'" - 6) > F,(ps'") (as FN is strictly
monotonically increasing), so that:
a (FJ(pS,) - FN(psf')) > 0 (12)
1-
But, this contradicts Assumption la (that F,(b) > FH(b)). So, 6 > 0.
Thus, beliefs about group Ps characteristics are more negative in period 2
than in period 1, as a result of the just world bias and the disproportionate
victimization suffered by Is in period 1.24 As the Bayesian inference is
6 = 0, the extent of this bias can be measured straightforwardly by the
magnitude of 6. Importantly, this measure of the extent of the bias depends
on the period-1 sanction imposed on hate crimes against Is. An important
caveat concerns the observability of the crimes that occur in period 1. The
analysis assumes that the crime rates suffered by each group (rxi and ry) are
observable, and that courts can perfectly observe expost whether crimes are
hate-motivated or not (i.e. whether they are committed by XH>s or X"'s).
Thus, if the outcomes of all trials were observable to period 2 X's, they
would be able to directly observe the number of hate crimes (commited by
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XH's) and the number of non-hate-motivated crimes (committed by X"'s)
that occurred in period 1. Under such circumstances, it would appear that the
underestimation of hate motivation involved in the just world bias requires
not just biased inference, but also that observers ignore available information
that contradicts their inferences. This point would be reinforced if courts
could observe not merely whether a perpetrator is an XH or XN, but also her
b. This would enable courts to publicize these b's (perhaps by calibrating the
penalty enhancement o the degree of hate motivation). If all crimes were
solved, this would make the true distribution FH(b) directly observable.
However, as long as there are some unsolved crimes (i.e. p < 1, as seems
likely in reality), the result in Proposition 1 will continue to hold, even when
the perpetrators of the solved crimes are known.25 For unsolved crimes, the
identity of the perpetrator is unknown, and an observer subject to the just
world bias can underattribute these crimes to XH>s (and hence infer a positive
C) without contradicting any directly observable information. Thus, if the
motivations behind at least some subset of crimes is unknown, then there is
scope for the just world bias to operate (i.e. for observers to underestimate
the role of hate motivation and to overestimate the role of the victimized
group's negative characteristics).26
Proposition 1: For marginal changes in sIH, C is decreasing in S i.
Proof Bearing in mind that the inferred C adjusts to maintain the
equality in Equation (10), it can be expressed as an identity:
aF1 (psfY) + (1-a)FN(psN) - aFN(ps Y) - (1-a)FN(psYN)- 0
(13)
Using the implicit-function rule:
dX _ ap(fH(psf) -fN(ps)) < 0 (14)
dsf' (1 -a)f,(ps - )
by Assumption lb.
Thus, the larger the sanction imposed on hate crimes against Y's in period
1, the less pronounced is the tendency to attribute negative characteristics to
's. Note that as the argument in Proposition 1 involves holding all other
variables fixed, a marginal increase in sH is equivalent to a marginal increase
in the penalty enhancement (s'H - s').
Equation (10) suggests a straightforward intuition for why this result holds.
Consider a given C, and suppose that s' (or equivalently the penalty
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enhancement (s' - sN)) is increased marginally. The observer (a period-2
member of XN who is subject to the just world bias) expects this change to
lead to a relatively small decrease in crimes against Y's (specifically, a fall of
fN(ps Y')). However, because the observer has underestimated the extent of
hatred among XH's, she is "surprised" by the size of the fall in crime against
Is (given by fH(ps'), where fH(ps') > f,(ps') by Assumption 1b).
Intuitively, this surprise occurs because the upper tail of the distribution of
XHs is thicker than the observer believes. The observed change in the level
of crime in response to the increase in the penalty enhancement is thus
inconsistent with the given value of 6. This forces the observer to revise her
estimate of 6 downwards (i.e. the characteristics of the outgroup are viewed
as being less negative).
Proposition 1 establishes that the bias due to the belief in a just world can
be reduced by increases in the penalty enhancement for hate crimes. The
importance of this bias stems from its role in influencing behavior, and in
particular the crime rates in period 2. It can be shown that the just world bias
generates additional crime in period 2 (i.e. crimes that would not have been
committed under the Bayesian inference that 6 = 0). The additional harm (or
decrease in social welfare) from these extra crimes is denoted by A, and can
be characterized as:
A = h(1 - a)(F,(ps ) - FN(psY -6)) (15)
It follows that:
Proposition 2: A is strictly positive when the just world bias exists
(i.e. when 6 > 0), and is strictly increasing in 6 (the extent of the just
world bias).
Proof Straightforwardly, 6 > 0 implies A > 0, and
A = h(1 - a)f,(psY - 6) > 0 (16)
Consequently, there is some amount of crime against 's in period 2 that is
directly attributable to the just world bias. In this sense, the just world bias
leads to disproportionate victimization per se being associated with harms
(extra crimes) that even a consequentialist would recognize. Moreover,
combining Propositions 1 and 2, it follows that the social harm from these
extra crimes is increasing in the extent of the bias, and hence decreasing in
the penalty enhancement for hate crimes. Thus, increasing the sanction
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imposed on hate-motivated crimes in period 1 reduces the extent to which
observers in period 2 draw negative inferences about the disfavored group's
characteristics. This, in turn, reduces the level of crime against the disfavored
group in period 2.27
There are a number of factors that may reinforce or counteract the basic
effects we identify in Propositions 1 and 2. For example, recall the
assumption above that X's do not view disproportionate victimization of Ps
as unjust, and hence are not subject to the just world bias. While the focus
has been entirely on the inferences made byXNs, the basic results would only
be strengthened if X's also committed additional crimes in period 2 due to
the just world bias. Similarly, the results would be reinforced if the period-2
XNs underestimate the proportion of haters in the population, as well as the
extent of their hatred.
The formulation in Equation (9) assumes that the new generation of 's
in period 2 correctly observes the sanctions that were in place in period 1.
Thus, the observer recognizes that XHs faced a sanction s' (which
potentially includes a penalty enhancement), even while underestimating the
hate motivation of XHs. If period 2 X's underestimate the sanction imposed
on hate crimes in period 1, then this may reduce the degree of surprise
occasioned by a marginal increase in the penalty enhancement. It is possible
that this could reduce (or even reverse) the revision of C described above. In
addition, it may be the case that (while underestimating the extent of hate
motivation among XHs, as assumed above) period 2 XNs attribute to XHs
some private information that Is have negative characteristics. This would
potentially "explain" the thickness in the tail of the distribution of X's
without necessarily revising C downwards, and hence may reduce or reverse
the effect in Proposition 1. However, all of these scenarios involve some
misperception or cognitive bias in addition to the just world bias. The aim of
the analysis above is to derive the effects attributable solely to the just world
bias per se by abstracting from all other potential information asymmetries
and cognitive biases.
Proposition 1 shows that marginal increases in sV' reduce C. On the other
hand, increases in s{' (the sanction for non-hate-motivated crimes against the
disfavored group) do not have an unambiguous effect on the extent of the
just world bias. Intuitively, an increase in si will not generate a surprise for
the observer, who has an accurate expectation of the consequences (a fall of
f (ps N) in crimes against Is). Instead, the effect (if any) of changes in s'
depends on the slope of the pdf fN, and is not readily susceptible to an
intuitive interpretation. Specifically:
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Proposition 3: For marginal changes ins N, d O
dSYN
iff1(psV) f(psV - 6).
Proof Using the implicit-function rule (as in the proof of Proposition 1):
d6 _ p(f(ps?) -f,(ps - 6))
ds f(ps -6)
from which the result follows straightforwardly.
This suggests that it is the penalty enhancement for hate-motivated crimes,
rather than the sanction for crimes against Ys per se, that has a clearer impact
on the perception that the outgroup has negative characteristics. Proposition
3 can thus explain an important and distinctive feature of hate crime penalty
enhancements, namely, that they are typically characterized by a concern for
offenders' motivation (either in terms of animus against 's, or the
discriminatory selection of 's as victims). This contrasts with "vulnerability"
penalty enhancements that are aimed at protecting certain particularly
vulnerable groups, such as the elderly (e.g. Moskowitz and DeBoer, 1999:41-42).
The latter kinds of enhancements are imposed without inquiring into
offenders' motivation. They are also not reciprocal (in the sense that they do
not apply if the victim is from any age group other than the elderly).
Vulnerability enhancements can be straightforwardly understood within
the standard economic model of crime: attacks against particularly vulnerable
victims are less costly to perpetrators (e.g. in terms of possible resistance or
retaliation by the victims) and may cause victims greater direct harm (e.g. if
the elderly are more likely to be injured by an attack of given severity). On
either of these grounds, enhanced penalties can be justified on optimal
deterrence grounds.
On the other hand, hate crime penalty enhancements are typically
characterized by a concern for offenders' motivation, and by reciprocity: for
any given statutory criteria, the enhancement attaches to a crime committed
against anyone on the basis of that criteria. When race is the criterion, for
example, anyone in the population, not just members of a particular race, can
be the victim of a hate crime justifying the enhancement. These features
cannot be readily explained within the standard economic model; however
they are consistent with the framework developed here. Proposition 3 shows
that this framework gives rise to a concern with offenders' motivation (rather
than simply with the group identity of the victim). Reciprocity arises in our
model because it is possible for multiple groups to simultaneously be
disproportionately victimized. In particular, the model can be readily
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extended to the case where there is hate motivation against the other group
among subsets of both A's and Is, and where the just world bias operates to
increase future crime against both X's and Is. In such a setting, both A's and
Is suffer more crime than they would in the absence of hate motivation
among offenders of the other group, and so each is subject to disparate
victimization. Consequently, penalty enhancements can reduce the social
harm from increased future crime against both groups. This argument also
extends straightforwardly to cases where there are more than two groups.
Finally, it should be noted that in a general welfare analysis, fully equalizing
victimization rates (as advocated by Harel and Parchomovsky, 1999) may not
be optimal because of the costs of imposing sanctions. The results from a
comprehensive welfare analysis are not qualitatively different from those in
Dharmapala and Garoupa (2004), where the optimality of penalty
enhancements depends crucially on enforcement costs and the probability
density function. With no enforcement costs, maximal penalties are optimal,
and the question of penalty enhancement is moot. Hence, enforcement costs
determine the structure of efficient sanctions. The probability distribution
function determines the exact direction and magnitude of penalty
enhancements, where a higher marginal benefit in terms of deterrence caused
by a penalty enhancement must be traded off against the higher marginal cost
of imposing it.
The main novelties in the welfare analysis caused by the explicit
consideration of the just world bias are the following. On the one hand, the
just world bias increases social welfare, because criminal actions are
vindicated by the belief that the victims deserve their victimization. The
reduction in the perceived wrongfulness of the criminal act makes those who
commit crimes better off While this positive effect on social welfare may be
viewed by some as ethically dubious, it is nonetheless worth noting from a
purely utilitarian standpoint. On the other hand, the just world bias dilutes
deterrence by raising the net benefits from crime; thus, it leads to a higher
level of crime for any given expected sanction. In the solution to the social
planner's problem, the "extra crime" effect derived in Propositions 1 and 2
leads to a greater willingness to impose penalty enhancements for hate
crimes, other things equal. Therefore, if we take the view that this second
effect is primary, the model justifies penalty enhancements for hate crimes
for reasons quite similar to Dharmapala and Garoupa (2004), that is, not
because hate crimes are exogenously more harmful, but because they
generate more harm endogenously by increasing the number of committed
crimes.
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4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Myrdal (1944) identified a "vicious circle" in ethnic relations. Individuals tend
to believe the world is more just than is actually the case, either because of
indoctrination during childhood or as self-deception that productively offsets
imperfect willpower. As a result, people have excessively strong priors that
outcomes are deserved. When they observe an individual suffering a bad
outcome, this prior belief conflicts with the inference that others unfairly
imposed the bad outcome on the individual. In the context of ethnic
relations, for example, observers will not sufficiently account for
discrimination when assessing the causes of the disfavored ethnic group's
poverty or poor education. Because they assess too little of the cause to
discrimination, they will attribute too much to the group's negative
characteristics; this victim-blaming produces additional discrimination. The
result is the vicious circle.
We wish to emphasize the generality of our Myrdalian results. As we have
noted throughout, the effects of disproportionate victimization and the BJW
may be manifested in a variety of ways. Our model could equally well be
illustrated by other forms of hostility, such as social or economic
discrimination. When the initial exogenous shock is a rise in hate crime, those
subject to a strong BJW who are not willing to engage in crime may still
blame the victim and therefore be more likely to engage in socially harmful
acts of non-criminal discrimination against the disfavored group. Similarly,
the initial exogenous shock may be a form of discrimination other than hate
crimes. Besides the more obvious examples of employment or housing
discrimination, consider the effect of racial profiling. Suppose that profiling
by law enforcement personnel is due (at least partly) to animus towards the
disfavored group. Then, observers would ascribe negative characteristics
(such as a high probability of guilt) to the victimized group in order to
reconcile these practices with Belief in a Just World. This could lead to an
increased level of discrimination (or indeed to increased hate crimes) against
the disfavored group. Thus, although our example is that hate crime
produces more (non-hate) crime, any form of discrimination against a group
can lead to greater discrimination against that group. When discrimination
produces bad outcomes for victims, those outcomes change beliefs in ways
that lead to more discrimination.
Returning to our hate crime example, we can summarize the argument as
follows. The existence of animus by some members of one group against
members of a second group leads to some potential offenders from the first
group deriving greater benefits from crimes against members of the second
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group. These benefits produce greater victimization of the second group
(under a system of uniform sanctions), which conflicts with notions of justice
that are widely held (at least among non-hate-motivated members of the first
group). Given their Belief in a Just World, some members of the first group
ascribe negative characteristics to the second group, making the latter's
greater victimization appear more deserved (or less undeserved). This, in
turn, raises their net benefits from committing crimes against the second
group, and thus results in additional crimes against the latter. These
additional crimes (or other manifestations of hostility) constitute a distinctive
social harm associated with disproportionate victimization.
Our model also shows that this social harm can be reduced by imposing
penalty enhancements for hate crimes against the second group in order to
ameliorate the bias. Our analysis generalizes. In particular, because the
potential for discriminatory preferences is reciprocal, so that members of the
second group can also commit hate-motivated crimes against members of the
first group, our analysis suggests that the penalty enhancement should also be
reciprocal (as they are). The analysis also carries through to the case where
there are three or more ethnic or racial groups. Finally, as explained above (in
discussing Proposition 3), our model demonstrates that the beneficial effect
of penalty enhancements applies only to penalties for hate-motivated crimes,
rather than for all crimes against the disfavored group.28 This highlights an
important difference between hate crime penalty enhancements and what are
termed "vulnerability" penalty enhancements that are aimed at protecting
certain particularly vulnerable groups, such as the elderly (e.g. Moskowitz and
DeBoer, 1999:41-42).
The latter point is important because one of the central challenges facing
any theory of penalty enhancements (e.g. Blake, 2001) is whether and why they
should apply to certain kinds of groups (e.g. racial or religious minorities) but
not others (e.g. young males aged 18-25, the homeless or the poor). Posner
(2001:233) argues that "... advocates of enhanced punishment for hate crimes
mean by the term [only] ... crimes against members of groups for which they
have a particular solicitude, such as blacks, Jews, and homosexuals." We do
not claim to have dispelled Posner's concern; interest group politics may
indeed explain how legislatures define hate crimes in the real world. Note, for
example, that the first two examples set out at the beginning of this article do
not constitute hate crimes under any existing statute even though they
illustrate our model as well as a racially motivated crime. However, our
analysis suggests some new, hitherto neglected, factors that are relevant to
the issue. Most fundamentally, our model suggests the importance of
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determining empirically, not only when disproportionate victimization exists
(because some offenders are motivated by hatred of the group), but when
such victimization is perceived as unjust. If there is no hatred or no
perception of injustice, then there is no scope for the BJW to operate.29 The
existing psychological literature does not directly address many of these
questions, so it is difficult to reach any firm conclusions. Nonetheless, we
hope that our analysis clarifies the issues involved, and suggests significant
areas for future inquiry.
The model has a number of additional implications. Note for example the
central role of uncertainty; the BJW influences inferences because there is
uncertainty about the causes of crime, as where the crime is unsolved and no
one directly observes the perpetrator's actions or motives. Under this
assumption, any reduction in the level of uncertainty, such as an increase in
the fraction of crimes that are solved, will reduce the need for inferring the
causes of crime and therefore reduce the scope of the BJW. When crimes are
known to have been committed because of hate motivation, they cannot be
attributed to nonhating offenders (and hence "explained" by the supposed
negative characteristics of the victimized group). This highlights the potential
importance of laws that force the revelation of hate motives (through e.g.
inquiries related to whether penalty enhancements should be applied). The
provision of credible information about the role of hate motivation in the
victimization of minority groups can ameliorate the vicious circle by
countering the inference that the crimes result from the perception of the
group's negative characteristics. Consistent with this notion is the
observation that human rights organizations opposed to hate crimes often
reveal and disseminate information about the role of hate motivation in
crimes against the victimized group. This information is intended to attribute
victimization to hate motivation as opposed to the negative characteristics of
the victimized group. Thus, such publicity tends to counteract the inference
underlying the vicious circle.
Third, although we have used our model to reveal the benefit of hate crime
penalty enhancements, one could derive alternative policy implications from
our model. Most obviously, given the point just made, is the advantage of
detecting more crimes. One could seek to offset the effect of the just world
bias on crime not only by greater penalties but also by an enhanced
probability of detection. There is some evidence that hate crime statutes may
actually work this way in jurisdictions where the police department creates a
special detective unit for investigating hate crimes that would not be
investigated as seriously or at all were there no hate motivation (Bell, 2002).
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Moreover, the discovery and provision of information about the motivations
of offenders may limit the influence of the BJW. The detection of crimes that
occur in period one, and the determination by the courts of whether the
perpetrators were hate-motivated or not, will tend to publicize information
about the extent of hate motivation among offenders. Greater accuracy in
courts' determination of offenders' motivations will also operate in the same
direction. This suggests a novel expressive benefit of law enforcement, which
is independent of whether or not penalty enhancements are imposed for
hate-motivated crimes.30
Less obviously, one could seek to offset the effect of the just world bias by
policies suppressing the dissemination of information about crime. If
members of the majority do not learn of crime, then the bias cannot cause
them to believe such victimization is deserved, and thereby increase crime.
There are of course significant costs to suppressing true information about
crimes (e.g. Dharmapala and McAdams, 2005), for instance, the reduced ability
of potential victims to take precautions against crime. In addition, if it were
known that information about crime is being suppressed, observers would
infer some expected level of crime, based on their prior beliefs. This would
reintroduce the just world bias. Indeed, it may even exacerbate it, as there
would be no directly observable information about offenders' motivation to
constrain the inferential bias. In view of these difficulties, we observe that
human rights and advocacy groups seeking to combat hate crimes typically
do not pursue this approach. Rather, they seek to publicize the role of hate
motivation to reduce the propensity of observers to attribute the crimes to
non-haters (and thus to revise their beliefs about the victimized group's
characteristics).
There are also a number of other possible informational effects of hate
crime statutes that may be relevant to our argument. For example, individuals
who are unaware that hate crimes against group X occur in their community
may infer from the passage of a hate crime statute that such crimes in fact
occur, and that members of group X suffer disproportionate victimization.
This, in turn, may lead to negative beliefs about group X through the just
world bias, an effect that may partially counteract the deterrent effect from
the hate crime statute.3' This would not be relevant, of course, in situations
where there has already been considerable publicity about hate crimes.
However, where there has been no such publicity (in particular, because there
have been no hate crimes), purely symbolic legislation might be
counterproductive.3 2
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1. B6nabou and Tirole (2006) also offer a "classical" intergenerational interpretation of the
just world belief that involves no irrationality. Parents tend to have different preferences
from their children, especially in having a lower discount rate for the future. Parents
therefore frequently desire that their children put forth greater effort and obey rules to a
greater degree than is consistent with their children's discount rates. One means of
motivating additional effort and obedience is for parents to indoctrinate children to
believe that the world is more just than it actually is, so that children will believe that in
the long term their outcomes depend more on effort and obedience, and less on good or
bad "luck" than is actually the case. The clich6 that "cheaters never prosper" probably
better motivates effort and obedience than would the more accurate statement that
"cheaters prosper only in certain narrow circumstances." On this view, adults then engage
in Bayesian inferences, but start out with priors from childhood weighted strongly towards
a belief in a just world.
2. Dharmapala and Garoupa (2004) extend the economic model of optimal enforcement to
the case where the population is divided into dominant and disfavored groups (defined,
e.g., by ethnicity or religion). A subset of potential offenders from the dominant group is
assumed to harbor racial animus (cf. Becker, 1957) in the form of discriminatory or
hateful preferences, so that they derive greater benefits from committing an otherwise
identical crime against members of the disfavored group than from committing the same
crime against a member of their own group. If expected sanctions are independent of the
victim's group, this hate motivation gives rise to an equilibrium in which members of the
disfavored group face a disproportionately high probability of victimization. A central
lesson of Dharmapala and Garoupa, however, is that penalty enhancements may or may
not be optimal on efficiency grounds, depending on factors such as the distribution of
benefits from crime and the social costs of sanctions. It appears that, within a
consequentialist (economic or utilitarian) framework, there is no harm caused by disparate
victmizaton per se.
3. Psychological evidence suggests that most people view crime victimization caused by hate
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motivation as more unjust than victimization caused by negative characteristics of the
victims (Rayburn, Mendoza and Davison, 2003).
4. It is important to emphasize that this mechanism is driven by uncertainty about the
motivations of offenders. In particular, we are not claiming that crimes that are known to
be hate-motivated will lead to negative inferences about victims, e.g. through an inference
that the victims must have done something to deserve such hatred. To the contrary, if one
observes what is known to be a hate-motivated crime, there is no reason to change one's
views about the characteristics of the victim; the haters' discriminatory preferences
constitute a sufficient explanation for their crimes. Rather, the effect we explore arises
when crimes are unsolved and the motive is ambiguous. In this context, the strong prior
Belief in aJust World causes observers to attribute a larger proportion of unsolved crimes
to non-haters than would one with a weaker prior. The central role of uncertainty has
several implications, including the idea that minority groups will seek to publicize the hate
preferences that motivate many of the crimes they suffer.
5. The latter type of statute has been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court, see Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
6. Similarly, in the UK, although "hate crime" has no specific legal meaning, hate motivation
is an aggravating factor in sentencing since the Criminal and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA
1998) and incitement to racial hatred has been extended to include religious grounds by
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA 2001).
7. For more extensive reviews, see Lerner and Miller (1978), Lerner (1980), Maes (1998),
Ross and Miller (2002), and Dharmapala, Garoupa and McAdams (2006).
8. One implication of this experiment is that, if observers are able to intervene in ways that
help the victim, the negative inferences about the victim's characteristics may be
ameliorated. However, in the application to hate crimes in this paper, it appears reasonable
to assume that most individuals will not be in a position to help crime victims they do not
personally know or encounter. It is worth noting, nonetheless, that the existence of
organizations that, for instance, accept donations to help crime victims may work to
counter negative inferences about victims.
9. A Stroop effect is a delay in performing an identification task; other research shows that
the delay reveals psychological stress. Typically, subjects are asked to identify the color of
a word flashed briefly on a screen. "[P]eople take longer to identify the color of words that
are associated with whatever is of emotional concern (i.e., whatever is threatening) than
the color of neutral words" (Hafer, 2000a: 166).
10. Hafer "primed" her subjects by having each write an essay about his or her life, focusing
either on future long-term goals (long-term focus condition) or current activities
(no-long-term focus condition). She then had the subjects observe a video of a student
talking to a counselor about he depression she began suffering after acquiring a sexually
transmitted disease (when a condom broke during intercourse). When asked to evaluate
the victim, subjects in the long-term focus condition derogated the victim significantly
more than those in the no-long-term focus condition.
11. We also believe we are justified in ignoring the BJW in modeling the decision to offend
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outside the group context, even though the negative inferences apply to all crime victims.
If an individual is randomly victimized, others may make negative inferences about her
characteristics, and this may raise the benefits to future crimes against her. However, the
probability that those who may commit those future crimes will (a) know of this particular
individual's victimization and (b) encounter this individual again in a setting where a crime
may be committed, is negligible. In contrast, if negative inferences are made about the
characteristics of an entire disfavored group, the probability of future criminals
encountering a member of that group is relatively high. Thus, the increased crime effect
could be argued to apply only to the latter case.
12. Even so, the study does not prove that the subset of the dominant group that commits
hate crimes shares this conception of justice. Thus, our model assumes that only those
individuals in the dominant group who are not hate-motivated view disparate
victimization as unjust (and are therefore subject to the Just World Bias). This assumption
does not mean that haters are more "rational" in making inferences, but simply
emphasizes that the results do not depend on haters viewing disparate victimization as
unjust.
13. Similarly, given that the finding that individuals tend to blame crime victims less when the
crime was hate motivated, there is no reason to believe that the public will make negative
inferences about groups from the mere existence of hate crime legislation. Also, unlike
affirmative action, which some may perceive as providing a "special privilege" for certain
groups, hate crime penalties are neutral regarding the relevant criteria, e.g., race or religion,
because one can incur an enhancement for crimes against members of the majority race or
religion as well as against minority races or religions. Indeed, much of the actual
enforcement of these laws involves the prosecution of minorities for crimes against
majorities.
14. Different group sizes would have a scale effect, but would make no qualitative difference
to the results of the model.
15. Introducing crimes committed by Ys would complicate the model, but would not affect
the basic results.
16. This can be generalized to the case where sanctions are not observable, as long as no
systematic errors are made by potential offenders in inferring the sanctions.
17. For the sake of additional realism we introduce the assumption that not all Xs are haters.
However we also assume that haters do not think that hate crimes are unjust; our results
would only be strengthened if we assumed otherwise.
18. For simplicity, it is assumed that X's only have beliefs about group Ys characteristics.
19. It is intuitive to think of c as the variation in the guilt or shame from committing the
offense. However, since there is no formal cost term in the model, it is easier, and
analytically equivalent, to place C on the benefit side. The motivation for this assumption
is that potential offenders sometimes expect to incur guilt or shame from committing a
crime, where the precise amount depends on the perceived characteristics of the victim.
The offender expects to incur less psychological aversion (guilt) or social disapproval
(shame) - i.e. less cost - to commit an offense against a person perceived to have negative
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characteristics (low moral worth) than against a person perceived to have positive
characteristics (high moral worth). For example, defrauding a "liar" and assaulting a
"bully" are less costly than committing the same crimes against a person without those
negative characteristics. It would be still more costly to commit the crimes against one
perceived to be the moral "pillar of the community."
20. This type of updating could also take place within a cohort. For simplicity, however, we
assume that all members of a given cohort are symmetrically informed, and that updating
only occurs across cohorts.
21. This formulation is sufficiently general to include the case where penalty enhancements
do not exist. The analysis below begins with the assumption of uniform sanctions
(sf=sH=s1N in period 1), before proceeding to analyze the consequences of penalty
enhancements.
22. Also, the empirical evidence cited above (e.g. Rayburn, Mendoza and Davison, 2003)
seems to suggest that hate-motivated victimization, rather than different victimization
rates across different groups per se are seen as unjust; thus, the former would be more
likely than the latter to trigger the just world bias.
23. Our assumption corresponds to a situation of complete naivet6 in the model of B6nabou
and Tirole (2006). Similar results would hold even if the underestimation of the extent of
hatred were only partial. Partial naivet6 raises the issue of how much the update of beliefs
might be manipulated by eliminating evidence, avoiding certain social interactions,
reassuring information, repression and other mechanisms discussed by B6nabou and
Tirole (2006).
24. These revised beliefs about the disfavored group's characteristics may potentially be
costly to those who engage in biased inference. For instance, these beliefs may induce
suboptimally low interaction or trade with the disfavored group. In the experiments cited
above, this was not an issue (the person evaluated by the subjects was a stranger whom
they would never meet again), but it may be important in real-world settings. We do not
explicitly model these costs. The implicit underlying assumption is that the desire to
believe in a just world is traded off against these costs. As long as some utility is derived
from the belief in a just world, then the biased inference and increased crime that we
identify would continue to hold. Note, however, that because beliefs represent a direct
source of utility in this setup (as, e.g., in Akerlof & Dickens, 1982), we cannot impose the
usual equilibrium condition that beliefs are correct in equilibrium. These wider conceptual
issues are not addressed here, but would be an interesting subject for future research.
25. The focus on unsolved crimes is intended to isolate the impact of the JWB per se by
abstracting away from all other forms of irrationality. If observers were assumed to, for
instance, wrongly attribute to non-haters crimes known to have been committed by haters,
then this would reinforce the effect of the JWB. However, this type of assumption is
stronger than required for the argument here.
26. Note why the normalization c=0 is not important for the results. First, the way we define
c, the larger is c the more negative the perceived characteristics. Assume observers start out
with c<0 (i.e., a belief that the outgroup has positive characteristics), then they will expect
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a very low crime rate against that group. The JWB (i.e., ignoring the existence of haters)
will make them expect an even lower crime rate, and so make their surprise (and
subsequent revision of c to something less negative or even positive) more pronounced.
However, there is nothing fundamentally different here from the case where the prior is
c= 0. Take now the opposite case, a prior of c>0. This means that observers start with a
prior belief that the outgroup has negative characteristics. Then, they would expect a very
high level of crime against that group, and (when they observe some lower level of crime)
would update their prior such that they end up with more favorable beliefs about the
outgroup's characteristics. With the JWB, all of the crime is attributed to non-haters, so
the inferred c will be more positive (i.e. inferred characteristics more negative) than if only
some of the crime were attributed to non-haters (as would happen without the JWB).
27. If the model were extended to multiple periods, the just world bias would potentially lead
to extra crime in each period, and perhaps eventually to a situation where all X 's commit
crime against Ys. This is possible for some distributions of preferences. However, for
more realistic distributions, a large fraction of X1V's would be expected to have values of b
sufficiently small that they would never commit the crime, even for the maximum possible
6. Then, there will be some limit to the escalation of crime.
28. Another important generalization concerns what happens when there are more than two
periods. Recall that a period is defined in the model by the entry of a new cohort of
individuals. As long as each new cohort is subject to the JWB, it will be "surprised" by the
victimization of the minority group, giving rise to negative inferences. In this sense, the
model can be generalized to multiple periods.
29. These issues are also important for the question of how hate crime statutes are framed.
There are two types of these statutes (e.g. Wang, 1999). One is based on an "animus"
model, focusing on the perpetrator's hostility to the victim's group. The other is the
"discriminatory selection" model (upheld by the US Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchel,
508 U.S. 476 (1993)), which punishes the selection of victims on the basis of group
membership, independently of motivation.
30. However, courts may have more incentive to accurately determine whether crimes are
hate-motivated if the sanctions they administer include penalty enhancements for hate
crimes.
31. Another possibility is that the penalty enhancement causes hate-motivated criminals to
conceal their motivation, whereas without the enhancement graffiti artists sometimes
reveal their motivation by the racist words or symbols they write on a wall or gravestone.
We note, however, that most of the many thousands of annual hate crimes carry no such
public indicia of motivation. Moreover, those who do write such hateful words or symbols
may have strong enough motives to continue to do so despite risking penalty
enhancements: to achieve status among fellow haters or gain the pleasure of hurting those
they hate, they may need to inflict more mental suffering on their victims that ordinary
graffiti produces.
32. The passage of legislation can potentially convey a variety of types of information, beyond
the hate crime context. New statutes may, for instance, reduce uncertainty about the
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content of the law, or reduce uncertainty concerning the preferences of others (in
particular, concerning the extent to which people disapprove of criminal behavior, and the
extent to which criminals benefit from crime). The overall effects are quite ambiguous.
For a discussion of the informational consequences of legislative enactments, see
Dharmapala and McAdams (2003).
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